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THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL VERDICTS
BY COURT-MARTIAL PANELS
Christopher Daniel Carrier*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article posits that a court-martial panel, unlike the jury in a civilian criminal trial, could be required by Congress to return a special verdict
rather than a general verdict. The peer jury and the court-martial panel are
now superficially very similar in function, but they differ in origin and authority such that legal and historical arguments about the powers of the jury
do not necessarily apply to the court-martial panel.
The article begins by noting the pre-constitutional origins of the jury
and its democratic authority as the voice of the community in the administration of criminal justice. The article then describes how these origins limit
the power of judges to intrude into the traditional domain of the jury,
though judges attempt to guide jurors and limit their discretion by the use of
instructions on the law. This section concludes by noting the very limited
use of jury questions in American criminal jury trials and some recent proposals to expand their use in that realm. In criminal trials in the United
States, jury questions are usually limited to questions about sentence enhancers, mental health defenses, or other special circumstances. The traditional reluctance to include questions about the core decision on guilt has
quietly eroded, but such questions are asked as interrogatories following a
vote on a general verdict.
The next section of the article notes the origins of the court-martial—
mythical, historical, and constitutional—to establish that the court-martial
panel does not derive its authority from the same sources as the peer jury.
Both jury trials and court-martials convened by military commanders predate the Constitution, which preserved the right to jury trial but also empowered Congress to adopt the court-martial as a form of trial without a
jury. Thus, because a court-martial panel is not a peer jury under the Constitution, many of the legal and historical arguments against jury questions in
criminal cases do not apply to court-martial panels.
* Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired). Attorney in private practice. B.A., The Citadel; J.D.,
University of Cincinnati; L.L.M., George Washington University; L.L.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. His professional experience includes service as prosecutor, trial defense
counsel, trial judge, and appellate defense counsel in military courts. He was also a member of the Army
Trial Judiciary’s Benchbook Committee, which drafts pattern panel instructions, and an executive secretary of the Joint Service Committee Working Group, which drafts Department of Defense proposals for
statutes and executive orders related to military justice.
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In a final substantive section, the article considers how such a change
might be implemented. In a comparativist spirit, the article considers the
way verdict forms are used in American civil trials, European criminal trials, and military bench trials, to consider possible methods to implement the
use of special verdicts in court-martial panel trials.
II. THE JURY

IN

AMERICAN CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS

A. The Peer Jury: A Democratic Institution Protected by the
Constitution
“The jury is a central foundation of our justice system and our democracy,” wrote Justice Kagan to begin an opinion on the importance of impartial peer jurors.1 Trial by jury is a pre-constitutional right protected by the
Constitution.2 The Stamp Act Congress in 1765 and the First Continental
Congress both cited deprivation of trial by jury as an outrage against the
American colonists.3 Most state constitutions adopted before the 1787 federal Constitutional Convention guaranteed the right to trial by jury.4 Proponents of the federal Constitution assured readers of The Federalist that “the
supposed abolition of the trial by jury, by the operation of this provision
[vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court], is fallacious and untrue.”5
To be sure, the Constitution was quickly amended to protect expressly the
right to jury trial in criminal cases.6
The Constitution did not have to describe and define the right to trial
by jury, because the English institution had been established by colonial
law and practice.7 To the First Continental Congress, it meant “the great
and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage” in
accordance with the common law of England.8 The composition of a jury in
the eighteenth century was not “democratic” in our more inclusive understanding of that word, but at least it was composed of the local laity, not
out-of-town political appointees.9 As American democracy, by steps large
and small, accorded the status of “peers” to everyone, the law required that
1. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
2. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 81, 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean ed., 1788) on concerns
whether the proposed Constitution would protect or infringe on the people’s right to trial by jury under
the common law.
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
4. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 485 (2009).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 2.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 2; LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 485.
8. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152.
9. See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 532–38 (discussing the gradual expansion of
juror eligibility).
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the jury “be truly representative of the community.”10 This inclusively democratic jury stepped into the shoes of an institution that had long wielded
independent power as the voice of the community.11
As this article will discuss below, a central dynamic in Anglo-American law is the tension between legal specialists (principally, that is, judges)
and the broader community, represented in court by the jury. Even after
English juries, in the seventeenth century, were freed from the more dramatic forms of constraint,12 English judges provided guidance in the form
of “summing up” the evidence, often in a manner suggesting the patent
idiocy of any contrasting interpretation of the evidence.13 When the right to
appeal jury trial convictions began, in England in 1907 and in United States
federal courts in 1889, this directive summing up by judges provided
grounds for appellate challenges, so judges had a powerful incentive to say
less about the evidence.14 Yet from the early Republic to this day, judges
presiding over trials have asserted control by instructing jurors on the content of the law.15 Jurors, in turn, have the final word in voting on a verdict,
no matter what the presiding judge may have said about the law to be applied. This article will not attempt to trace the history of this judge-juror
dynamic, but it aims to demonstrate that the prohibition against requiring
special verdicts from criminal trial juries resulted from that being seen as
too great an intrusion on the domain belonging to the jurors.16
Indeed, jurors have the power of reaching a verdict that cannot be logically reconciled with the law. This is called jury nullification: “Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court.”17 American courts do not generally allow lawyers to
argue explicitly for nullification, and judges use evidentiary rules to exclude
evidence relevant only to persuading the jurors to nullify.18 Sometimes, of
course, nullification is in the eye of the beholder, and even judges agree that
jurors are entitled “to look at more than logic” in deciding cases, because
10. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
11. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 26 (1985) (“The jury’s power to
render verdicts against the evidence was perhaps the most distinctive aspect of medieval [English] criminal law.”). See also LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 475–85.
12. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 430–34 (citing Bushel’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006 (1670)).
13. Id. at 431–33.
14. Renée Lettow Lerner, How the Creation of Appellate Courts in England and the United States
Limited Judicial Comment on Evidence to the Jury, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 215 (2016).
15. See id. at 478–80, 514–15, 529–32.
16. Some legal historians, for example, interpret the complicated evidentiary rules applied in Anglo-American courts as part of this “centuries old” efforts of “jury control.” LANGBEIN, LERNER &
SMITH, supra note 4, at 448–57.
17. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997), quoted by the California Supreme
Court in California v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1221 (Cal. 2001) and often cited in recent years.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Penn, 969 F.3d 450, 458 (5th Cir. 2020).
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the jury is “the conscience of the community.”19 In the next section, this
article will address how judges may and may not use instructions on the law
to guide or control the jurors’ discretion in rendering verdicts.
B. The Role of Judges in Criminal Jury Trials
In federal criminal trials, both civilian and military, a defendant’s ability to ask for findings of fact in a judge-alone trial is “an important right of
the defendant in a non-jury criminal case”20 because “the special findings
enable the appellate court to determine the legal significance attributed to
particular facts by the military judge, and to determine whether the judge
correctly applied any presumption of law, or used appropriate legal standards.”21 After a conviction at a jury trial, appellate lawyers scour the jury
instructions for misstatements of the law,22 but in a judge-alone trial there is
no public articulation of the law applied by the judge in reaching a verdict—except when there are special findings.
Judges can be required to “show their work,” as math teachers say,
while jurors may only be required to answer the ultimate question of guilty
or not guilty. Perhaps this distinction is an accident of history, but because
it has been accepted for so long, I infer a connection to the source of legitimacy of each office. Judges’ decisions are worthy of respect when they
accord with the law, but jurors have the ambiguous status of being subject
to the law as members of the community, while holding a kind of democratic veto power over the enforcement of the law in a particular case.
Criminal defendants therefore have to choose whether to be tried by a
legal specialist, who can be required to return special findings disclosing
possible error on which to appeal, or to be tried by a lay jury, which has the
power of nullification, but which also can convict without having to disclose its rationale. The defendant who opts for the inscrutable jury decision
must hope that, to the extent any point of law benefits the defense, the
jurors adhere to the judge’s instructions on the elements of each charged
offense.
In American law, crimes are defined by elements, and the elements of
federal crimes must be established by Congress.23 Federal civilian juries
and military panels are instructed on the definitions applicable to each element, and that someone is guilty of a crime only if all the elements have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.24 As noted above, if jurors abide
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
United States v. Girard, 11 M.J. 440, 441 (C.M.A. 1981); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c).
United States v. Hussey, 1 M.J. 804, 808–09 (A.F. Ct. Mil. Rev. 1976).
Id. at 809.
See generally Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); 1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTR. CRIM. ¶ 9.07 (2021).
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by the oath to follow the law as instructed, appellate courts reviewing a
conviction know what law was applied in the trial. Also, adherence to jury
instructions means all defendants are tried based on legal definitions that
are uniform from one courtroom to the next, and from one week to the next,
in that jurisdiction. Of course, not all scholars are sanguine about the efficacy of the American model of jury instruction. Writing in praise of the
German practice of having professional judges collaborate in deliberation
with lay jurors, John Langbein opined, “[t]he trial judge’s instructions ostensibly identify and resolve for the jurors in advance of their deliberations
the legal problems that may arise, although the format of multiple contingent instructions protracts the trial and probably bewilders the jurors.”25
Judges in American cases can also influence jury decisions by circumscribing the options available to the jury. As part of the judge’s role in
channeling the jurors’ discretion into the legal framework established by the
legislature, judges will not instruct a jury on any defense not raised by the
evidence at trial, or any lesser included offense not raised by the evidence at
trial. A classic case demonstrating this point, with a fact pattern worthy of
Joseph Conrad,26 is the Supreme Court’s 1895 decision in Sparf v. United
States.27 This case illustrates the asserted point of law that sometimes the
evidence in a case does not logically allow a finding of a lesser included
offense. Specifically, the evidence in the case supported either murder by
the defendants or perjury by the witnesses. In January 1893, the coal ship
Hesper was en route from New South Wales to Honolulu with a crew of
fourteen.28 On the night of January 13, the starboard watch consisted of
second mate Maurice Fitzgerald and three other crewmen: St. Clair, Sparf,
and Hansen.29 Upon their relief, Fitzgerald was missing, but a search of the
ship found a blood smear near the mainmast, a “broom covered with blood”
near the ladder, and “a narrow strip of scalp with a small piece of hair stuck
together by blood” near the gangway.30
25. John Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 6 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 195, 202 (1981).
26. See Mutiny and Murder; Bloody Work on Board the Bark Hesper, SANTA BARBARA MORNING
PRESS 1 (Mar. 9, 1893) (“The plot was hatched by Thomas Leclair [sic], Herman Sparf, Hans Hansen,
Thomas Green [not the legal historian of the same name] and Edward Larsen, to murder the Captain,
first and second mates, cook and a Greek sailor, and then run the vessel either to China or the Chilean
coast, sell the cargo and fit the bark out for a piratical cruise.”).
27. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
28. Transcript of Record at 18, St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894) (No. 1062) [hereinafter St. Clair Transcript of Record].
29. Id. at 18–20. Another crew member (Larsen) was on duty at the wheel. Id. Ultimately, St. Clair
and Hansen would be hanged, and Sparf would go free, though he was shunned by other sailors. Would
Not Sail with Sparf, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE 7 (Dec. 24, 1895).
30. St. Clair Transcript of Record, supra note 28, at 20–21; Transcript of Record at 29–30, Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (No. 613) [hereinafter Sparf Transcript of Record].
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Sparf, who had a spot of blood on his cheek, told the captain that he
had seen Fitzgerald climb up the fore rigging and had not seen him come
down.31 The three conspirators of the starboard watch were soon in irons,
and two other conspirators made an unsuccessful attempt to free them as the
captain diverted the ship to French Polynesia for the protection of the
United States consul on Tahiti.32
Many of these facts are in the Transcripts of Record or the case reporter (or press accounts) but not in the Sparf opinion itself, which simply
tells the reader that the “evidence tended strongly to show that Fitzgerald
was murdered pursuant to a plan formed between St. Clair, Sparf, and Hansen; that all three actively participated in the murder; and that the crime was
committed under the most revolting circumstances.”33 More specifically,
witnesses testified at trial that St. Clair ambushed Fitzgerald in the dark and
beat him with an axe after he had already been rendered helpless, and then
St. Clair and Sparf threw the dead or dying man overboard, as part of a plot
with Sparf and Hansen to take control of the vessel.34
The indictment did not specify the murder weapon or which of the
three wielded it, but alleged that they “piratically, willfully, feloniously, and
with malice aforethought” struck and beat Fitzgerald, inflicting “grievous,
dangerous, and mortal wounds” before casting him from the vessel into the
sea to drown.35 The indictment also did not attempt to distinguish whether
Fitzgerald died from the blunt force trauma or from drowning, but alleged
that some combination of the “said mortal wounds, casting, throwing,
plunging, sinking, and drowning the said Maurice Fitzgerald in and upon
the high seas aforesaid, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State of the
United States of America,” caused his death.36
The sailors were prosecuted under a statute prescribing death for murder committed “within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States, and not within the jurisdiction of any particular state.”37 At that
time, “[t]here [was] no definition of ‘murder’ by any United States statute.”38 Prevailing instead was the common law of murder and manslaughter, which the trial judge explained to the jury.39 There was, however, a
federal statute to the effect that a jury could find a defendant guilty of a
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Sparf Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 20.
Mutiny and Murder, supra note 26.
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 53 (1895).
Sparf Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 43–50.
Id. at 1 (the indictment included Sparf, Hansen, and St. Clair).
Id. at 1–2.
St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 145 (1894).
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 59.
Id.
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lesser included offense, if justified by the evidence.40 When a juror during
deliberation asked the judge for further instructions about liability for aiding and abetting, and whether manslaughter was an option, the judge reminded the jurors of his instruction that homicide with malice was murder.41
The lengthy exchange included in pertinent part:
JUROR. A crime committed on the high seas must have been murder, or can
it be manslaughter?
COURT. In a proper case, it may be murder, or it may be manslaughter; but
in this case it cannot be properly manslaughter.42

Thomas St. Clair’s motion to be tried separately had been granted,
with the consequence that his capital appeal reached the United States Supreme Court in 1894, two years before the High Court appeal of Sparf and
Hansen, who were tried together.43 On appeal, St. Clair argued that the trial
judge had erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on the lesser
included offense of manslaughter, but his defense counsel at trial had not
“taken exception” to that ruling, so the issue had not been preserved.44 In
Sparf the issue at trial was preserved, so at the Supreme Court it became the
landmark case on this aspect of jury control.45
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge had been correct in finding
that the evidence in the case did not logically permit a finding of manslaughter:
The court below assumed, and correctly, that section 1035 of the Revised
Statutes did not authorize a jury in a criminal case to find the defendant
guilty of a less offence than the one charged, unless the evidence justified
them in so doing. Congress did not intend to invest juries in criminal cases
with power arbitrarily to disregard the evidence and the principles of law
applicable to the case on trial.46

At a glance, the trial judge’s refusal to sanction the lesser included
offense may appear to be severe, but it would be better described as not
countenancing conviction on an offense unsupported by competent evidence—albeit a lesser offense than the one charged in the indictment. Jury
nullification allows acquittal, not conviction on an offense for which there
40. St. Clair, 154 U.S. at 154; Sparf, 156 U.S. at 63. This distinction has been elided by at least one
published commentary, which erroneously wrote, “The murder statute under which the defendants were
charged provided for the lesser included offense of manslaughter.” Lawrence W. Crispo, Jill M. Slansky
& Geanene M. Yriarte, Jury Nullification: Law versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 11 (1997).
41. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 61 n.1.
42. Id.; Sparf Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 67.
43. St. Clair Transcript of Record, supra note 28, at 6.
44. St. Clair, 154 U.S. at 153–54.
45. Sparf Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 74.
46. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 63.
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was not competent evidence. As the Supreme Court stated, the jury would
have had to “disregard the evidence” that allowed two interpretations: mutinous murder or falsely accused defendants.
While the Sparf decision shows that judges can instruct jurors in a way
that circumscribes their discretion, we must now examine a limitation on
judges’ authority to dictate legal conclusions to jurors. The Supreme Court
precedents discussed in this passage protect the jury’s right to decide
whether the evidence on an element of a charged offense is sufficient for
conviction, proscribing jury instructions purporting to bind the jurors to the
judge’s finding. Such instructions contradict the presumption of innocence
and intrude on the domain of the finder of fact, which is the jury in a jury
trial.
In Sandstrom v. Montana47 in 1979, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a jury instruction stating that “the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,”48 and held that the
instruction violated the due process rights of a murder defendant because it
could be understood as a conclusive presumption of the defendant’s mens
rea.49 Sandstrom made a general rule from the Court’s more particular ruling from the year before in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,50 which had
disallowed an instruction in a Sherman Act prosecution that if the defendants’ act affected prices, it was “presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result.”51 Such instructions that an element of the offense (in
these cases, the mens rea of the defendant) was presumed, without the jurors’ independent evaluation, violated due process because “the decision on
the issue of intent must be left to the trier of fact alone,” and “[t]he instruction given invaded this factfinding function.”52
In United States v. Gaudin,53 the Supreme Court considered a jury
instruction given in a trial on the charge of making a false statement to a
federal agency, an offense which has as an element that the false statement
was material.54 In the instruction challenged on appeal, the trial judge had
instructed the jurors that the materiality of the statement, if made, was “the
decision of the court.”55 While noting there was some precedent for judicial
ruling on materiality in fraud cases, Justice Scalia’s opinion for a unani47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

442 U.S. 512 (1979).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 519.
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
Id. at 430.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 446).
515 U.S. 506 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 1001.
515 U.S. at 508.
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mous Court found the practice dubiously historical and inconsistent with
the broader principle that the trier of fact must decide such questions.56
Today’s federal criminal juries are instructed that they may infer criminal intent from circumstantial evidence, among other permissible inferences, but the language of the instruction must make clear that the inference
is permissive, not required. This trial practice creates a terminological discontinuity: “Many of the inferences recognized by common law were and
are still called ‘presumptions.’ However, if used in an instruction, these
‘presumptions’ must be phrased in terms of a permissive inference.”57
Sandstrom, Gypsum, and Gaudin describe a limitation on the power of
judges to intrude into the domain of the jury. In the next section, we see
another important point of judicial deference to the authority of jurors: the
general prohibition against requiring special verdicts from juries in criminal
cases.
C. Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials
In American criminal practice, the general verdict has long been the
rule in jury trials, and it remains the norm. As the Eighth Circuit wrote in
1949, in criminal jury trials “the practice has been settled time out of mind
to charge but one crime in one count, to accept but one general plea to it
and to call upon the jury to make but one general response, guilty or not
guilty.”58 A law review note in 2003 observed that “[t]rue special verdicts
are almost never used in criminal cases.”59 In 1969, the First Circuit in
United States v. Spock60 held that “[s]pecial verdicts as to a single count are
improper and in and of themselves erroneous.”61 The Spock court found
that the general verdict in criminal cases was a necessary part of protecting
the independence of the jury, which should not be ensnared by a judge’s
manipulations:
There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to
approach it step by step. A juror, wishing to acquit, may be formally cat56. Id. at 518–19.
57. 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12.05 (6th ed. 2006) (citing
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514–19).
58. Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1949). The court in Gray described the use
of a special verdict form with a criminal trial jury as an “innovation.” Id. at 924.
59. Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal
Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263 (2003).
60. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
61. United States v. Adcock, 447 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing and encapsulating Spock,
416 F.2d at 182–83). The Spock decision noted the use of special findings for sentence aggravators and
in treason cases with regard to overt acts. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41. In one such case, the Court held
that “[s]ince the jury returned special verdicts and findings as to each of the eight overt acts, we could
not upset the judgment of conviction, unless all eight were insufficient.” Kawakita v. United States, 343
U.S. 717, 737 (1952).
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echized. By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an
answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for
a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be
accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by
the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions.62

Today, the common phrase is that special verdicts in criminal jury trials are “disfavored,” but general verdicts with interrogatories (sometimes
using “special verdict” forms) are no longer rare, and the distinction between special verdicts and general verdicts with interrogatories is not always clearly stated.63
The 2003 law review note by Kate H. Nepveu described several practices in American courts that are at least closely akin to special verdicts or
special interrogatories in criminal cases, especially as part of sentencing
procedure, or defenses such as insanity.64 Nepveu cataloged state court uses
of jury questions to find extenuating or mitigating factors, or in effect to
distinguish greater and lesser offenses.65 Whether some of these instances
should be considered a true special verdict—an independently valid vote on
an element of the offense itself—is a matter of interpretation. Consider, for
example, the requirement that a jury find a suitable aggravating circumstance for a murder to be a capital offense: the mechanism for such a finding may be conceived as an element that distinguishes one offense from
another, or an aggravating factor submitted to the jury as an interrogatory in
connection with a general verdict.66
The boldest use of jury questions in the findings of criminal trial juries
that Ms. Nepveu cited was the use of interrogatories to identify the predi62. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. This “oft-cited” passage was quoted by Charles Hintz in a law review
article which called for the adoption of a universal requirement for general verdicts with special interrogatories in all criminal cases as a way to ensure that jurors have assessed each element of an offense.
Charles Eric Hintz, Fair Questions: A Call and Proposal for Using General Verdicts with Special Interrogatories to Prevent Biases and Unjust Convictions, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 43, 47 (2021).
63. Nepveu, supra note 59, at 263 (“ ‘Special verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal trials.’
This statement appears so often in judicial discussions of jury verdicts, it is nearly a platitude.”).
64. Id. at 269–80. In military practice, a finding of insanity is construed as one of the options of
what is labeled as a general verdict (guilty; not guilty; not guilty of the charged offense but guilty of a
lesser included offense; guilty of the charge with specified exceptions and substitutions within a permissible variance; or not guilty by lack of mental responsibility). See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 918(a) (2019).
65. The note was so exhaustive in its survey that some of the cases cited only tangentially implicated the question of special findings, as opposed to the form of jury instructions. Certainly, juror confusion or uncertainty as to unanimity in findings is always somewhat relevant to the issue of special
findings or jury questions, which could potentially remedy such problems more decisively than simply
giving the jury further instructions.
66. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The
Manual for Courts-Martial excludes these questions as a matter of definition: “Special findings do not
include, for example, the members’ deliberation and voting on aggravating factors in a capital case . . .
or on the defense of mental responsibility. . . .” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
R.C.M. 918(b).
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cate acts relied upon in convictions in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) cases.67
These also seem to be general verdicts with interrogatories rather than
“true” special verdicts but examining all the verdict forms would be necessary to confirm that.
As a more recent example, in 2012 a federal district court in South
Dakota employed a general verdict with special interrogatories, over defense objection, for a charge of disposing of a firearm to a prohibited person.68 The federal statute has four classes of prohibited persons, and the
defendant (Stegmeier) had allegedly given a firearm to someone (Kelley)
whom the evidence indicated was in two of those four classes.
The district court sought to ensure that the jury reached unanimity that
Stegmeier knew Kelley was a felon, and/or unanimity that Stegmeier knew
he was a fugitive. In addition to so instructing the jury, the district court
required the jury to answer special interrogatories:
Did you unanimously agree that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause
to believe that Thomas R. Kelley had been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year?
_ YES _ NO
Did you unanimously agree that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause
to believe that Thomas R. Kelley was a fugitive from justice?
_ YES _ NO69

The district court insisted that the procedure benefitted Stegmeier by
ensuring that there was jury unanimity on at least one of the two ways the
offense could be committed.70 Notably, when the defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal, the district court’s denial of the motion stressed the
distinction between a true special verdict and a general verdict with interrogatories: “There was no special verdict for the crime . . . charged in Count
One of the Indictment.”71 The circuit court reviewed for an abuse of discretion and affirmed, repeatedly using the term “special verdict form,” but
67. Nepveu, supra note 59, at 276–79. See also Eric S. Miller, Compound-Complex Criminal Statutes and the Constitution: Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 YALE L.J. 2277, 2305–07
(1995).
68. United States v. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 881 (2013).
69. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d at 580–81.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Stegmeier, No. CR 11-40038, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138744, at *2–3 (Dec. 2,
2011). This use of the terms “special verdict” or “special verdict forms,” not only for general verdicts
with interrogatories but also for findings on matters other than the elements or a defense, can give a
misleading impression that actual special verdicts are being employed. See, e.g., United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court submitted two special verdict forms,
asking the jury to find, in the event it reached a guilty verdict, (1) whether Lamoreaux abused a position
of trust at NuCare ‘in order to facilitate the commission and concealment of mail fraud,’ and (2) the
amount of Lamoreaux’s ‘monetary gain . . . as a result of the crimes of mail fraud.’ ”).
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opining that the procedure used by the trial court did not implicate any of
the reasons special verdicts or interrogatories are disfavored:
The judge did not infringe upon the jury’s power to freely deliberate, did not
require the jury to justify its actions, and did not ask “why” the jury arrived
at its decision. Nor did the court challenge the jury’s power to ignore the
court’s instructions if it so desired, require the jury to set aside its most
valuable asset as fact finder (collective common sense), or direct the jury,
intentionally or unintentionally, to follow a course initiated by the court.72

Nota bene the court’s abjuration of having asked why the jury arrived
at its decision. Those calling for the “reasoned verdict” portion of a civil
law form of verdict in American criminal cases may be choosing the
tougher bullet to chew.73 In the time since jury independence was established in Bushel’s Case74 and the trial of Peter Zenger,75 the United States
has developed a strong tradition that a jury’s deliberation is all but inviolable. The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado76
represented the exception demonstrating the rule, allowing impeachment of
a jury verdict by evidence of racial bias, as a distinct category, while retaining the general rule that jury deliberations must not be scrutinized.77 Justice
Kennedy reassured the reader that “careful voir dire,” jury instructions, and
“thoughtful deliberation” could “help ensure that the exception is limited to
rare cases.”78 The decision was hardly an encouragement to make windows
into jurors’ deliberations.
A University of Pennsylvania research fellow recently invoked PeñaRodriguez, specifically its call for countermeasures against racial bias in
criminal justice, in the opening of an online law review article calling for
special interrogatories—after any vote to convict—in all criminal cases.79
Implementing such a rule would be a dramatic innovation, but it would
retain the general verdict and employ jury questions “when, but only when,
[the jurors] are proceeding towards a finding of guilt[.]”80 The article cited
research on the weaknesses of jury decision making, refuting every Law
72. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d at 581–82 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 671 (8th Cir.
1993)). Ryan had a general verdict with interrogatories, only to be answered following a vote to convict.
Inconveniently, Lexis omits the decision appendix containing the questions, but they can be seen at
https://perma.cc/XV8Q-T55C.
73. See infra text accompanying note 215. For further discussion of practices in civil law, as opposed to common law, countries, see infra Part IV(B).
74. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). For the history and importance of Bushel’s Case in establishing jurors’ independence from juridical control, see GREEN, supra note 11, at 236–49.
75. 17 Howell’s State Trials 675 (1735). For the history and importance of Zenger’s 1735 libel case
in New York, see LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 4, at 475–80.
76. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
77. Id. at 869.
78. Id. at 860, 871.
79. Hintz, supra note 62, at 45.
80. Id. at 46.
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Day speech on the glory of juries,81 and argued that if interrogatories on the
elements were a second step after a vote on a general verdict, they could
only benefit the defendant as a check on the jurors’ grasp of the elements.82
Although the author did not mention affirmative defenses, it would be consistent with his theme to include questions about affirmative defenses in
addition to questions about the elements of the charged offenses.
The author proposed an elaborate procedure, which I will summarize
but cannot endorse: “When jurors retire to deliberate, they should receive
three verdict forms, each in a separate sealed folder.”83 The first folder
would contain a general verdict form, instructing the jurors to open the second sealed folder if they vote to convict.84 The second folder would contain
a special verdict form with questions on the elements, instructing them that
they could reconsider the general verdict after completing the second
form—shredding the special verdict form if the general verdict were reconsidered.85 The third sealed folder would be opened if the jury confirmed its
conviction in the special verdict vote and would contain sentencing and
collateral questions.86 Having been a trial judge, and having practiced in
front of many trial judges, who uniformly feared confusing the jurors, I feel
confident in saying that judges would prefer to use a special verdict form or
a general verdict form with interrogatories, rather than a series of sealed
folders. More workable approaches to special verdicts may be found in
American civil cases or European courts, as will be discussed in Section IV.
Before addressing method, however, this article will now address the question of whether the reasons special verdicts cannot be required in criminal
jury trials also apply to trials by court-martial panel.
III. THE PANEL

IN

AMERICAN COURT-MARTIAL TRIALS

A. The Court-Martial Panel: A Military Institution Allowed by the
Constitution
In noting some key points in the evolution of American military law,
this section will focus on change rather than continuity. Indeed, it will accuse others, including serious scholars, of exaggerating the continuity in
military law. The purpose of this provocation is to advance my theory that
today’s court-martial is legitimated by adherence to law, not by the traditional rationale of military discipline at any cost. The court-martial, I will
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 49–54.
at 44–48, 55–57.
at 56.
at 56–57.
at 56.
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argue, began as an instrument of military discipline subject to the power of
the commander, but it has evolved into a court of law that accounts for the
needs of military discipline but also provides due process.
The Constitution provides that the President is commander-in-chief of
the armed forces,87 but empowers Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.88 The latter constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court has said, “is a power to provide for trial and
punishment by military courts without a jury.”89 In 1789, Congress acted on
this power by adopting the Articles of War then in force by authority of the
Continental Congress.90 The pre-constitutional Articles of War, in turn, had
been adopted largely from the British Articles of War,91 which provided for
courts-martial, meaning evidentiary hearings by panels of officers.92
Colonel William Winthrop and other authors cited below seem to savor such points of continuity, and no less a scholar than John Adams also
believed that the British Articles of War were “a literal translation of the
Roman” military law.93 Query how President Adams’ romantic belief in a
literal translation of this classical antecedent can be reconciled with Colonel
Winthrop’s acknowledgement that “no written military codes remain from
the times of the Greeks or Romans.”94 Notwithstanding this concession to
unromantic fact, Winthrop’s 1895 treatise on Military Law and Precedents,
which has been called the “Blackstone of Military Law,”95 asserts vaguely
that the British Articles of War had “their inception in remote antiquity.”96 I
submit that the alleged continuity with ancient or medieval military practices is merely the disciplinary function necessary in war, which we may
distinguish from codes and procedures, which if we are being frank, limit
rather than enhance the power of the military commander.97
The Roman military commander had powers untrammeled by codes
and lawyers, and a brief review of that law throws cold water on romantic
notions of continuity, or the desirability of continuity. For military offenses,
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
88. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
89. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 137 (1866).
90. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 47–48 (2d ed. 1920).
91. Id.
92. Id. at app’x VII, British Articles of War in force at the beginning of our Revolutionary War.
93. Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L.
REV. 169, 169 (1953).
94. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 17.
95. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957).
96. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 17, 18 n.1.
97. See generally David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215
MIL. L. REV. 1, 74 (2013) (“The thrust of the Code—as of the Articles of War—is to recognize the
commander’s authority to exercise good order and discipline. Provisions in the Code, the Manual for
Courts-Martial, service regulations, and case law provide checks on the commander’s exercise of that
authority.”).
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the summary authority of the Roman commander was vast, ranging from
extra duty for minor offenses to “individual or collective death penalties in
extreme cases to punish deserters or cowards.”98 Tellingly, every Roman
legion camp had a tribunal, but the word at that time meant the raised platform from which the commander would oversee and lecture the troops.99
The soldiers’ oath of obedience was personal to the commander, not to any
constitution or law, and a new oath was required if a new commander was
appointed.100 As for juridical institutions, modern authors interpret the
sources as indicating that an officer of the day supervised the stator (meaning here and in a civilian context a “supporter,” not to say an “enforcer”),
the soldier assigned to maintain discipline.101 Query what part of this
sounds like an antecedent to military justice, as opposed to merely military
discipline.
The romantic notion also persists that something recognizable as a
court-martial precursor can be found in the early Middle Ages, brought to
England by the Norman Conquest. Colonel Winthrop’s inclusion of William the Conqueror and the medieval Court of Chivalry102 in the lineage of
the modern court-martial is confusing and probably inaccurate. More recent
scholarship shows that some past authors apparently confused the origin of
the offices of Lord High Constable and Earl Marshal—who did later preside in the Court of Chivalry—with the origin of the civil law court called
by that name, which was established in 1348 by Edward III.103 Writing in
the Military Law Review in 1980, now-Professor David Schlueter relayed
some of this dubious lore, in language that I fear suggests a legal sophistication that did not exist:
The Duke of Normandy (William the Conqueror) vested the power and authority of his court of chivalry in his high officials; the particulars of this
court will be discussed later. It was this system of military justice which he
carried to England in the 11th century.104
In the preceding discussion on the early European court-martial model, we
noted the rise of the courts of honor, the court of chivalry, curia militaris.
With his armies, William the Conqueror carried that system of justice to
England and established it as his forum for administering military justice.105
98. YANN LE BOHEC, THE IMPERIAL ROMAN ARMY 61 (trans. Raphael Bate, 2000).
99. Id. at 159.
100. LAWRENCE KEPPIE, THE MAKING OF THE ROMAN ARMY 78 (1998).
101. LE BOHEC, supra note 98, at 56 (citing TACITUS, HISTORIES 1.28.1).
102. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 46.
103. William H. Dunham, Jr., Review: The High Court of Chivalry: A Study of the Civil Law in
England, 65 AM. HIST. REV. 106 (1959). Cf. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 47.
104. David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129, 132 (1980).
105. Id. at 136.
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Although Professor Schlueter cited barrister and historian G.D.
Squibb’s authoritative history of the Court of Chivalry,106 he contradicted,
without acknowledgment or explanation, a rather important passage from it:
The name “Curia Militaris” has been the cause of misconception concerning
the antiquity as well as the nature of the Court of Chivalry. It would be
unnecessary even to mention the myth that the Court of Chivalry dates from
the reign of William the Conqueror were it not that it received judicial authority in the charge of Cockburn C.J. to the grand jury in R. v. Nelson and
Brand [1867]. As will be seen below, the Conqueror had been dead for two
and a half centuries before the Court of Chivalry appeared on the English
scene. We owe the story of its Norman origin to an attempt by Edward IV to
enlarge its jurisdiction.107

Moreover, “the records of the Court of Chivalry do not include a single
case relating to the ‘offences and miscarriages of soldiers contrary to the
laws and rules of the army’” such as “desertion or mutiny or any other
offence within the jurisdiction of the modern court-martial.”108 We may
wish to include the glamorously named Court of Chivalry in our legal ancestry, but the connection is tenuous.
Colonel Winthrop and Professor Schlueter gain stronger footing in the
historical record when they move on to Gustavus Adolphus and British military law emerging from the Glorious Revolution.109 The military code
promulgated by Gustavus Adolphus indeed looks like something to be
called early modern, and “it is readily concluded that not a few of the articles of the English codes of a later date were shaped after this model or
suggested by its provisions.”110
The seventeenth century, perhaps not coincidentally the century of the
English Civil Wars and the Glorious Revolution, provided the models of the
British Articles of War that were transmitted to the first independent Americans. At that time, however, these military codes were still rough justice.
William Blackstone, writing about British military law in 1765, called it
“entirely arbitrary in its decisions” and “built upon no settled principles.”111
Such protections as were provided by the Articles of War did not make it, in
his view, a respectable system of law: “The necessity of order and disci106. Id. at 131, 136, 138.
107. GEORGE DREWRY SQUIBB, THE HIGH COURT OF CHIVALRY: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL LAW IN
ENGLAND 10 (1959) (internal citation omitted). Included in this remarkable book is Squibb’s account of
his own successful 1954 representation of the Manchester Corporation in a claim against a Manchester
theater for its unlicensed use of the Corporation’s heraldic devices—the first sitting of the Court of
Chivalry since 1737. Id. at 123–27. Understandably, the hereditary Earl Marshal (the Duke of Norfolk)
issued a warrant for the Chief Justice to hear the case as his surrogate. Id.
108. Id. at 8.
109. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 19–20, 46–47; Schlueter, supra note 104, at 132–35, 141–44.
110. WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 19. See id. app. III, Articles of War of Gustavus Adolphus of
1621.
111. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 413 (1765).
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pline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance.”112 Again
stressing discontinuity in this history, we now shift to the twentieth century
changes that created today’s military justice system.
The watershed event in making American military justice less an arm
of command and more a system of law was enactment of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950.113 As Professor David Schlueter has
summarized:
In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled to balance the need for the commander to maintain discipline within the ranks against the belief that
the military justice system could be made fairer, to protect the rights of
servicemembers against the arbitrary actions of commanders. The final
product could be considered a compromise.114

This “compromise” criminal law system forms part of what constitutional scholar Jonathan Turley has called a “military pocket republic.”115 In
response to the American Civil War and World War II, the political
branches (Congress and the President) created a powerful military establishment,116 and the third branch of government, the Supreme Court, has historically shown remarkable deference to the military,117 accepting its arguments about national security or the uniqueness of military culture to allow
divergence from legal norms in many areas.118 An important example of
such a divergence is that Congress continues to allow, and the Supreme
Court continues to sanction, “trial and punishment by military courts without a jury.”119 As Professor Turley has noted, the constitutional provisions
enabling a separate military justice system are permissive with regard to
congressional power, and may not justify the deference historically shown
by the Supreme Court.120 We may therefore say that the court-martial panel
112. Id. at 413.
113. Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 108.
114. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum, supra note 104, at 4.
115. Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
116. Id. at 44 (“[T]he significant expansion of the military into conventional civilian areas did not
occur until after the Civil War and experienced its greatest expansion after the Second World War.”)
117. See id. at 37–48.
118. Id. at 47–48 (“The Court has stressed that judges lack the competence to review military decisions, which are the products of a unique society and specialized training.”). Professor Turley’s work in
this area largely addresses civil-military relations and sovereign immunity. See Jonathan Turley, Pax
Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003).
119. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 137 (1866).
120. Turley, Military Pocket Republic, supra note 115, at 40. As for the exemption from grand jury
indictment, Winthrop opined, “In the view of the author, the [Fifth] Amendment, in the particular indicated [grand jury indictment], is rather a declaratory recognition and sanction of an existing military
jurisdiction than an original provision initiating such a jurisdiction.” WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 48
(emphasis in original).
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is a statutory creature allowed by the Constitution, in contrast to the peer
jury, which is an institution guaranteed by the Constitution.121
While a jury of one’s peers is part of democratic government,122 the
members of a court-martial panel are selected by the military commander
with statutory authority to convene the court.123 Commanders select panel
members, on an individual basis, who are senior to the accused in military
rank or grade,124 and whom the commanders deem “best qualified for the
duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and
judicial temperament.”125 As Justice Kagan wrote in Ortiz v. United
States,126 a court-martial remains “an officer-led tribunal convened to determine guilt or innocence and levy appropriate punishment, up to lifetime
imprisonment or execution.”127 The Ortiz Court held that the military courts
at each level are judicial bodies deciding criminal cases “in strict accordance with a body of federal law (of course including the Constitution).”128
This judicial character led the Court to conclude that Supreme Court review
of military cases was an exercise of appellate, not original, jurisdiction.129 I
submit that the legitimacy of the court-martial panel depends on this adherence to law, because unlike a jury it has no independent standing as a democratic body.130
B. The Role of Judges in Court-Martial Panel Trials
Over time, court-martial procedure has shifted such that the court-martial panel now resembles a civilian jury. Until 1969, an American courtmartial had no judge.131 The presiding officer at a trial was the panel president, being the “senior in rank among the members appointed to a general
or special court-martial.”132 An important innovation of the post-World
War II enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was its creation
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. See supra Section II(A).
123. See Articles 22–25a, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. §§ 822–825a).
124. Article 25(e)(1), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 825(e)(1)).
125. Article 25(e)(2), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)).
126. 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018).
127. Id. at 2171.
128. Id. at 2174.
129. Id. at 2174–75.
130. Note that the commander’s selection of the panel members means that a court-martial panel is
not even composed of the accused’s peers within the military community.
131. The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, which created the office,
took effect on August 1, 1969. See also Exec. Order No. 11,476, 34 Fed. Reg. 10,502 (June 19, 1969)
(implementing a manual for courts-martial).
132. Manual for Courts-Martial, Exec. Order No. 10,214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303, 1319 (Feb. 10, 1951).
In American military law before 1828, a court-martial president was separately appointed, but from that
date the senior appointed panel member served as president of the court-martial. WINTHROP, supra note
90, at 170.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/1

18

Carrier: <em>Special Verdicts by Court-Martial Panels</em>
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\83-1\MON101.txt

2022

unknown

Seq: 19

10-MAR-22

SPECIAL VERDICTS BY COURT-MARTIAL PANELS

15:57

19

of a “law officer” to rule on interlocutory matters,133 but the services
baulked at the idea of having a lawyer preside over a court-martial as
judge.134 Although a military judge now presides over most court-martial
functions,135 the office of panel president remains part of court-martial procedure, with the panel’s most senior officer presiding over the panel’s
closed deliberations and speaking for the panel in announcing its decisions
or requesting instructions from the judge.136
General William T. Sherman, we may infer, would have hated this
shift of power from the president and the members to a military judge. Professor Turley, in an article on the tension between military culture and our
Madisonian republic, quoted an 1880 diatribe by General Sherman that recalls Jack Nicholson’s courtroom speech in the movie A Few Good Men:
It will be a grave error if, by negligence, we permit the military law to
become emasculated by allowing lawyers to inject into it principles derived
from their practice in the civil courts, which belong to a totally different
system of Jurisprudence. The object of the civil law is to secure to every
human being in a community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible, consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to govern
armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest
measure of force at the will of the nation . . . An army is a collection of
armed men obliged to obey one man. Every enactment, every change of rule
which impairs the principle weakens the army, impairs its value, and defeats
the very object of its existence.137

An argument unavailable to General Sherman would have been that
Congress had no power to make such changes. The armed forces may be a
practical necessity, but the political branches of government may craft them
as they see fit. As noted above, the constitutional carveouts for military
justice create no obligation on Congress. This section will suggest that imposing order in the armed forces, which includes enforcing civilian control
over the armed forces, may sometimes be served by conveying power away
from court-martial panel members and giving it to the military judges. To
make the discussion more concrete, it describes a point of law where I see
an unacknowledged shift of the line between the power of the civilian jury
and the power of the military panel.
133. Manual for Courts-Martial, Exec. Order No. 10,214, 16 Fed. Reg. at 1319. Before enactment of
the UCMJ, an Army court-martial included a “law member” who advised the court and voted with it, but
whose opinions were not binding, while a Navy court-martial was advised on the law by the prosecuting
attorney. Andrew S. Effron, United States v. DuBay and the Evolution of Military Law, 207 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2011).
134. Effron, supra note 133, at 8–11.
135. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 801(a).
136. Id. 502(b).
137. Jonathan Turley, Trials and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in
a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 651–52 (2002).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana,

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 83 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\83-1\MON101.txt

20

unknown

Seq: 20

10-MAR-22

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

15:57

Vol. 83

This issue in question is whether the court-martial panel or the military
judge should decide, in the case of someone charged with disobeying a
lawful order, whether the order was lawful. Judges are meant to be experts
on what is and is not lawful, but might not the lawfulness of an order depend on the factual circumstances? And recall the discussion above of the
Supreme Court holdings in Sandstrom, Gypsum, and Gaudin.138 In Gaudin,
a trial judge could not instruct the jurors that a false statement, if made, was
material as a matter of law. The military courts, however, have insisted that
military judges must decide whether a disobeyed order was lawful.
Under Articles 90, 91, and 92 of the UCMJ,139 a junior servicemember
is liable for prosecution for failing to obey, inter alia, off-the-cuff oral instructions uttered by a superior commissioned or noncommissioned officer.140 The lawfulness of the order announces itself boldly as a question of
law, but it also looks like an element of the offense, or perhaps an affirmative defense, which ought therefore to be a matter for the trier of fact.
Winthrop’s treatise expressed the classical view that “lawful order”
was redundant (like “enforceable contract”) because an unlawful order was
no true order.141 The lawfulness of an order was to be presumed, and to
overcome the presumption of lawfulness, an order must be “clearly repugnant to some specific statute, to the law or usage of the military service, or
to the general law of the land.”142 Modern sensibilities on this point do not
hew as closely to the side of presumptive obedience to orders, and as a
more contemporary judge observed in a case discussed below, “[t]here has
always been an uneasy tension between the concept of ‘instinctive obedience’ and the expectation that servicemembers will not obey unlawful orders.”143
Winthrop’s description of the burden on the defense to show illegality
of a disobeyed order sounds to me like an affirmative defense:
The unlawfulness of the command must thus be a fact, and, in view of the
general presumption of law in favor of the authority of military orders emanating from official superiors, the onus of establishing this fact will, in all
cases—except where the order is palpably illegal upon its face—devolve
upon the defence [sic], and clear and convincing evidence will be required
to rebut the presumption.144

In 1952, the United States Court of Military Appeals cited this language with approval, and reinforced the construal of an order’s illegality as
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra Section II(B).
10 U.S.C. §§ 890–892.
Id.
WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 575.
Id.
United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Effron, J., concurring).
WINTHROP, supra note 90, at 575–76 (emphasis in original).
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an affirmative defense by upholding a conviction because the order had
“not been shown affirmatively to be illegal.”145 If the illegality of a disobeyed order is an affirmative defense (or an element of the offense in the
first place), the decision would normally be submitted to the trier of fact.146
In 1965, however, the United States Court of Military Appeals in United
States v. Carson147 wrote that the legality of an order was a question of law,
not a matter to be submitted to the panel members:
Whether an act comports with law, that is, whether it is legal or illegal, is a
question of law, not an issue of fact for determination by the triers of fact.
For example, in a prosecution for disobedience of an order . . . the courtmartial must determine whether the order was given to the accused, but it
may not consider whether the order was legal or illegal in relation to a constitutional or statutory right of the accused.148

In this context, the term “court-martial” in the last sentence refers to the
court-martial panel, as opposed to the “law officer” who advised the court
but did not preside.149
The opposite conclusion was announced by the United States Court of
Military Appeals in 1989 in Unger v. Ziemniak.150 The Unger court wrote
in the context of an interlocutory appeal that “[i]n a prosecution for disobedience, lawfulness of the command is an element of the offense.”151 A
Navy lieutenant had refused an order to urinate under direct supervision for
purposes of a drug test “because of her claimed constitutional rights to privacy and to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and also because, in her view, the direct observation by an enlisted person constituted
fraternization and demeaned her status as an officer.”152 The trial judge
denied a motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the order was not
lawful, and in answering the interlocutory appeal, the highest military court
opined that the lawfulness of the command was an element of the offense
subject to a rebuttable presumption.153 In fact, the court advised the trial
judge to dismiss the charge if he “determines from undisputed facts that the
order was illegal.”154 While this could be construed as simply applying the
145. United States v. Trani, 3 C.M.R. 27, 30–31 (C.M.A. 1952).
146. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
147. 35 C.M.R. 379 (C.M.A. 1965).
148. Id. at 380.
149. In 1969, Congress amended Article 51 (10 U.S.C. § 851) to create the position of military
judge, with greater authority than the predecessor position of law officer. The law officer, unlike the
“law member” position it replaced, was not a member of the court-martial.
150. 27 M.J. 349, 358 (C.M.A. 1989).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 351.
153. Id. at 359.
154. Id. (emphasis added). Note that this was in effect an advisory opinion. The United States Court
of Military Appeals and, at least until recently, its successor the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces often issued tutelary opinions.
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standard for a motion for a finding of not guilty under Rule for CourtsMartial 917 on the grounds that a conviction could not be sustained by
competent evidence, such a reading would mean treating the lawfulness of
the order as an element of the offense, not as a question of law.155
More curiously, the Unger court said that whether the panel members
should decide the lawfulness of the order depended on whether the evidence
raised the question, which would be more consistent with construing the
question as an affirmative defense, not as an element necessary in the prosecution’s prima facie case:
If, in a trial by members, the military judge determines that no evidence has
been offered to rebut the presumed legality of the order to provide a urine
specimen, he need not advise the members as to what facts might rebut the
presumption. If, however, he concludes from all the evidence that an issue
exists as to whether the servicemember had been ordered to provide the
specimen under unreasonable conditions, he should submit the issue to the
court members for their consideration.156

Under this schema, the trial judge would determine whether an affirmative defense had been raised by some evidence and submit the question to
the panel if it had been.
This bewildering welter of different interpretations of the issue came
to a head in a high-profile political case decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces in 2001: United States v. New.157 In 1995,
Army medic Michael New’s unit had been ordered to prepare for deployment to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of a United
Nations Preventive Deployment Force, which would wear U.N. accoutrements including a pale blue beret.158 Specialist New refused to obey the
order to add the U.N. beret and insignia to his uniform, and was courtmartialed for disobeying a lawful order.159 At trial, Specialist New argued
that the legality of the order was an element of the charged offense and thus
had to be submitted to the military panel, not decided by the trial judge.160
At the time of Specialist New’s trial, the Military Judges’ Benchbook,
which provides pattern jury instructions for courts-martial in all the armed
forces, provided the military judge with the three options set out in Unger v.
Ziemniak.161 If the legality of the order was “clear as a matter of law,” the
judge could so rule and instruct the panel that the question was settled.162 If
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 917 (2019).
Unger, 27 M.J. at 359.
55 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 955 (2001).
Id. at 97–98.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 100.
MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, DEP’T OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 27-9, ¶¶ 3–59 (Oct. 1986).
Id.
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the judge determined “as a matter of law” that the order was not lawful, the
judge should dismiss the specification.163 “If there is a factual dispute as to
whether or not the order was lawful, that dispute must be resolved by the
members in connection with their determination of guilt or innocence.”164
This last option anticipated the possibility that the legality of an order might
be contingent on disputed facts, such as whether a target had been adequately identified.165
The trial judge in Specialist New’s case decided “as a matter of law”
that the order to don the U.N. blue beret had been a lawful order.166 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld the
trial judge’s decision on the basis that the lawfulness of the order was a
question of law and not a “discrete element.”167 The rationale of the decision sounds less like legal reasoning and more like a policy argument specific to the military sphere:
By contrast, if the issue of lawfulness were treated as an element that must
be proved in each case beyond a reasonable doubt, the validity of regulations and orders of critical import to the national security would be subject
to unreviewable and potentially inconsistent treatment by different courtmartial panels.168

Further, Judge Andrew Effron concurred in the result in New but wrote
separately to opine that the particular case should have been decided as a
political question: “There is nothing in the more than two centuries of our
history as a Nation that suggests courts-martial should be empowered to
rule on the propriety of deployment orders as a matter of either constitutional or military law.”169 Judge Eugene Sullivan also wrote separately to
express the view that the order’s lawfulness was an element, relying in part
on Gaudin—though he concurred in the result.170
Specialist New’s direct appeal was followed by collateral attack in the
civilian courts on petition for habeas corpus.171 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found “no fundamental defect”
in the military court’s decision that “distinguished lawfulness from ‘wrong163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Judge Sullivan’s concurrence defended this view, but with little clear authority for it, citing at a
stretch United States v. Robinson, 20 C.M.R. 63 (C.M.A. 1955), a case about whether enlisted soldiers
could be required to serve in the officers’ mess at Fort McNair. New, 55 M.J. at 115 (Sullivan, J.,
concurring). That case had approved submission to the court-martial of a factual question requisite to
finding the order to have been lawful.
166. New, 55 M.J. at 106–07.
167. Id. at 105.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 110 (Effron, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 115 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
171. United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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fulness’ and ‘materiality’” in other offenses.172 The Circuit Court discussed
the “tangled” question of what standard of review actually applied in habeas
corpus review by a civilian court, settling on the test of whether there had
been “fair consideration” of the issues by the military courts.173 Noting that
under Article 51, UCMJ,174 an element must be submitted to the military
jury, the habeas corpus decision rather obtusely stated, “Other than the idea
that lawfulness must be an element of the offense (coupled with § 851’s
requirement), New appears to offer no legal reason why the lawfulness issue
should have gone to the military jury.”175 One might rejoin that the Circuit
Court decision provided no legal reason why the lawfulness issue should
not have gone to the jury other than the ipse dixit that lawfulness was not an
element of the offense.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces reaffirmed its position that the legality of an order is within the bailiwick of the trial judge and not the finder of fact in United States v.
Deisher176 in 2005. In Deisher, the court actually overturned a conviction
because an Air Force trial judge had submitted the question to the courtmartial panel, rather than deciding the issue by making his own findings
and conclusions.177
Query whether a disinterested legal reasoner would agree that New accords with Gaudin. Given the potential importance of contested facts in
deciding the materiality of a false statement or the lawfulness of a military
order, these would seem to be elements of the offense in question, to be
submitted to the trier of fact. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has elsewhere acknowledged that even in the context of military offenses, “the elements of an offense cannot be established by a conclusive presumption.”178
Under the current edition of the Military Judges’ Benchbook, the trial
judge decides whether the command was lawful, dismissing the specification if it was not, and otherwise instructs the panel that “[a]s a matter of
law, the command in this case, as described in the specification, if in fact
there was such a command, was a lawful command.”179 This construction
submits to the laity only the question “if in fact there was such a com172. Id. at 408.
173. Id. at 406, 408.
174. 10 U.S.C. § 851(c).
175. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d at 408.
176. 61 M.J. 313, 314 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
177. Id. at 314.
178. United States v. Phillips, 70 M.J. 161, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (employing the “general article”
(10 U.S.C. § 934) to prosecute conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces).
179. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, DEP’T OF THE ARMY PAM. 27-9, 1094 (2020) [hereinafter
“BENCHBOOK”].
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mand,” and excludes from the laity’s consideration whether the order was
lawful, even if the lawfulness of the order depends on contested facts.
As I said at the outset, I see in this issue an unacknowledged shift of
the line between the power of the civilian jury and the power of the military
panel. The policy reasons cited by Judge Effron regarding this vexed question, and the decision of military courts to draw the line in New differently
than in Gaudin, could be interpreted to mean that a court-martial panel does
not have the same authority as a peer jury, and its discretion can be more
narrowly circumscribed. A court-martial is, please recall, a criminal trial
“without a jury.”180 If power to decide the lawfulness of orders may be
taken from the court-martial panel, could it also be required to return a
special verdict?
C. Special Verdicts by Judges in Court-Martial Trials
Article 51 of the UCMJ governs the findings of a court-martial, which
may be composed of panel members or a military judge sitting alone.181
Only in a judge-alone trial are special findings allowed: “The military judge
of such a court-martial shall make a general finding and shall in addition on
request find the facts specially.”182
This statute is implemented at the Executive Order level in the Rules
for Courts-Martial, which provide in pertinent part, “[s]pecial findings may
be requested only as to matters of fact reasonably in issue as to an offense
and need be made only as to offenses of which the accused was found
guilty.”183 The comment on this Rule provided by the Manual for CourtsMartial, a Department of Defense publication in which comments labeled
“discussion” are only persuasive authority, notes that special findings “ordinarily include” findings as to the elements of the offense and any relevant
affirmative defense.184 This discussion also states conclusively that
“[m]embers may not make special findings.”185 Of course, that is the question under examination, so this article will now look at the procedures for
special findings by judges to see how they might be adapted to use by
panels.
The Military Judges’ Benchbook, an Army publication used by all the
services as the source of pattern panel instructions and trial forms, provides
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 137 (1866).
10 U.S.C. § 851 (2021).
Id. § 851(d).
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 918(b) (2019).
Id.
Id.
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in an appendix a model for special findings in judge-alone trials.186 The
first example given for special findings as to guilt on an offense shows a
definitive statement for each element of the offense, including the predicate
fact:
MJ: In view of the (request) (need) for special findings in this case, I shall
now announce them. The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows:
a. That, on 3 September 2020, at Fort Blank, Missouri, the accused absented
himself from his unit, namely: Company B, 20th Signal Battalion, 20th Infantry Division, Fort Blank, Missouri;
b. That such absence was without proper authority from anyone competent
to give him leave; and
c. That he remained so absent until 25 September 2020.187

A second example suggests a definitive statement for each element,
including the predicate facts, and a narrative explanation for an affirmative
defense:
MJ: In view of the (request) (need) for special findings in this case, I shall
now announce them.
a. The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows:
(1) That, on 2 September 2020, at the Service Club, Fort Blank, Missouri,
the accused did bodily harm to PFC John Smith by striking him on the head;
(2) That the accused did so with a certain means, namely: a beer bottle;
(3) That the bodily harm was done with unlawful force and violence;
(4) That such means was used in a manner likely to produce grievous bodily
harm.
b. With respect to the accused’s claim of self-defense, the court finds that,
under the circumstances, there were no reasonable grounds for the accused
to apprehend that PFC Smith was about to inflict death or grievous bodily
harm upon the accused. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the accused,
without provocation, used profane and abusive language toward PFC Smith
and struck him as PFC Smith attempted to leave the premises in order to
avoid an altercation with the accused. While the court finds that before he
was struck by the accused, PFC Smith did shove the accused’s arm away
from him when the accused attempted to block Smith’s departure, such an
act, under all the circumstances, could not have caused a reasonable, careful
person to apprehend death or grievous bodily harm.
186. BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at app. F. In three years as a court-martial judge, I routinely made
findings of fact and conclusions of law in motions practice, but I was never asked for special findings as
to guilt.
187. Id. at 1964.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/1

26

Carrier: <em>Special Verdicts by Court-Martial Panels</em>
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\83-1\MON101.txt

2022

unknown

Seq: 27

10-MAR-22

SPECIAL VERDICTS BY COURT-MARTIAL PANELS

15:57

27

Consequently, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused
did not act in self-defense and that the force used by the accused was without justification or excuse.188

This level of articulation seems appropriate, and this article suggests a
single question for each element, except when an element contains more
than one material fact. The narrative form of the special finding on the
affirmative defense, however, would less easily translate into a special verdict form for a jury.
IV. HOW SPECIAL VERDICTS

BY

PANELS MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED

A. Civil Jury Trials in the United States
A civil jury trial in the United States is a vanishing phenomenon, but
when it does occur, findings by special verdict seems to be more common
than a general verdict. Academic writing suggests that this was not always
so, and that American judges in the middle of the twentieth century were
reluctant to employ special verdicts in civil cases.189 Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure remains substantially unchanged, apart from the
2007 “stylistic” revision.190 As alternatives to a general verdict in a civil
case, the trial judge may ask the jury to return a special verdict, or a general
verdict accompanied by answers to “written questions on one or more issues of fact that the jury must decide.”191 The portion of the rule on special
verdicts provides, “[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding on each issue of fact.”192
An interesting example of a special verdict form comes from a cigarette manufacturer liability case tried in 1988.193 After five years of discovery and four months of trial, a federal district court jury in New Jersey was
presented with the following twenty questions:
1. Has plaintiff proven all of the elements necessary to establish fraudulent
misrepresentation or concealment by defendant Liggett, prior to 1966, of
188. Id. at 1964–65.
189. Samuel M. Driver, A Consideration of the More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 25 WASH.
L. REV. 43, 44 (1950) (“[N]o direct statistics are available, but there are what appear to me to be plain
indications that, in most jurisdictions, its use has been very limited.”). Driver was a federal district court
judge, and his article cited a journal article by Circuit Court Judge Jerome Frank that encouraged more
use of special verdicts and a federal circuit court decision that rued a district court judge’s refusal to use
a special verdict in a railroad employee injury case, Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1948). Perhaps in a couple generations, military practitioners will be so accustomed to
special verdicts in criminal cases that most will be unaware that it was “disfavored” in the not-toodistant past.
190. See Mfr. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852, 853 (D. Md. 1939).
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(1).
192. Id. 49(a)(1).
193. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
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material facts concerning significant health risks associated with cigarette
smoking?
Yes ___
No X
2. Has plaintiff proven all of the elements necessary to establish fraudulent
misrepresentation by defendant Philip Morris, prior to 1966, of material
facts concerning significant health risks associated with cigarette smoking?
Yes ___
No X
3. Has plaintiff proven all of the elements necessary to establish fraudulent
misrepresentation by defendant Lorillard, prior to 1966, of material facts
concerning significant health risks associated with cigarette smoking?
Yes ___
No X
4. Was there a conspiracy prior to 1966 to fraudulently misrepresent and/or
conceal material facts concerning significant health risks associated with
cigarette smoking?
Yes ___
No X
5. If you answered “yes” to question #4, were any of the defendants members of that conspiracy?
Liggett Group, Inc.
Yes No
Philip Morris Incorporated
Yes No
Lorillard, Inc.
Yes
6. If you answered “yes” to question number 5, has plaintiff proven all of
the elements necessary to establish fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, prior to 1966, by any member of the conspiracy?
Yes ___
No ___
7. Should Liggett, prior to 1966, have warned consumers regarding health
risks of smoking?
Yes X
No ___
8. If you answered “yes” to question 7, was that failure to warn prior to
1966 a proximate cause of all or some of Mrs. Cipollone’s smoking?
Yes X
No ___
9. If you answered “yes” to question 8, was such smoking a proximate cause
of Mrs. Cipollone’s lung cancer and death?
Yes X
No ___
10. If you answered “yes” to question 9, did Mrs. Cipollone voluntarily and
unreasonably encounter a known danger by smoking cigarettes?
Yes X
No ___
11. If you answered “yes” to question 10, was this conduct by Mrs. Cipollone a proximate cause of her lung cancer and death?
Yes X
No ___
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12. If you answered “yes” to question 11, what is the percentage of responsibility for Mrs. Cipollone’s injuries attributable to each of the following
parties:
Mrs. Cipollone
80%
Liggett Group, Inc.
20%
[NOTE: The sum of these percentages must equal 100%].
13. Did Liggett make express warranties to consumers regarding the health
aspects of its cigarettes?
Yes _X_ No ___
14. If you answered “yes” to question 13, did any Liggett products used by
Mrs. Cipollone breach that warranty?
Yes X
No ___
15. If you answered “yes” to question 14, was Mrs. Cipollone’s use of these
products a proximate cause of her lung cancer and death?
Yes X
No ___
16. If you answered “yes” to any of the following questions: 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 or
15, what damages did Mrs. Cipollone sustain?
$ none
17. If you answered “yes” to any of the following questions: 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, or
15, what damages did Mr. Cipollone sustain?
$ 400,000
18. If you answered “yes” to any of the following questions: 1, 2, 3, 6 or 9,
is plaintiff entitled to punitive damages against one or more of the defendants?
Yes ___
No X
19. If you answered “yes” to question 18, to what amount is plaintiff entitled?
___________
20. If you awarded a sum under question 19, what amount of this total is
attributable to each of the following parties?
Liggett Group, Inc.
$________
Philip Morris Incorporated
$________
Lorillard, Inc.
$________
[NOTE: these amounts should add up to the total awarded under question 19.]194

The first three questions are compound, asking if all the elements of a
claim had been established. Note also that other questions are skipped, as
moot, as part of the decision tree scheme of the questionnaire. Americans
are somewhat accustomed to, if not fond of, decision tree questions and
instructions from the annual ritual of preparing income taxes. The tax forms
194. Id. at 553–54.
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promulgated by the IRS take the statutes passed by Congress and the regulations published by agencies and translate them into step-by-step forms. In
the same way, a well-designed set of jury questions can guide a jury
through the elements of an offense, indicating which questions are in the
alternative, and how to proceed after answering each question.
While many aspects of the tobacco liability decision can be discerned
from the questions and answers alone, others depend on interaction with
applicable law. For example, in Questions 7 through 12, the jury found that
the cigarette company had a duty to warn consumers and that its failure in
that regard contributed to the death of Mrs. Cipollone, but under New
Jersey law, a plaintiff more than 50% responsible for injury cannot recover
any damages.195
In the same way, questions could be asked of a criminal jury without
providing on the form a complete explanation of their legal consequence.
Questions discriminating between greater and lesser offenses, for example,
could be asked of the jury and the answers interpreted by the trial judge
upon examination of the form.
B. European Criminal Trials
Other examples and experiences of using jury questions can be sought
in the European countries which following the French Revolution introduced the jury as a democratic check on the aristocratic civil law tradition.196 The European experimentation with juries did not overcome the
great cultural momentum of the civil law tradition.197 Whereas the AngloAmerican legal system developed in its peculiar fashion largely to accommodate jury trials, the European systems compelled the jury to conform to
the norms of the pre-existing legal culture.198 In France, this took the form
of a migration back to professional control of legal decisions.199
Having experimented with various court compositions, the French ultimately landed on a system whose appeal to judges should be obvious. A
195. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 554.
196. STEPHEN THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 198–99 (2d ed. 2008). See also JAMES
DONOVAN, JURIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 29 (2010) (“The jury would be the spokesman of the general will in the judicial
realm, and the judge would be strictly confined to the role of servant of the law. This was in part a
reaction against the power of the old parlements (royal appeals courts), whose judges had been independent by virtue of the purchase and inheritance of their offices and whose ability to refuse to register
decrees and to protest against them had blocked reforms in the decades before the Revolution.”).
197. DONOVAN, supra note 196, at 158–83.
198. Id.; see also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for
an American Murder in the French Cour d’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 813–14 (2001).
199. Professor Donovan described this process and result as part of the broader “triumph of fonctionnaires over democracy by the mid-twentieth century” and the “rise of government by experts—by
trained, professional administrators.” DONOVAN, supra note 196, at 158.
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description of criminal courts should begin by noting their substantive jurisdiction. While in the United States offenses are taxonomized as felonies,
misdemeanors, and violations, French law has “crimes, délits, and contraventions,” which largely overlay with their American equivalents except for
the dividing line between the two more serious categories.200 In the United
States, felonies are generally offenses for which the accused faces more
than one year of imprisonment, and commonly in a state system, misdemeanors are tried in a lower court (albeit with a right to jury trial), often
called “district court,” while felonies are referred to a higher court, often
called the “circuit court,” even when the two courts have entirely congruent
geographic jurisdiction.201 In contrast, in French law the highest category of
offenses (called, unfortunately for translation, crimes) includes a narrower
upper range of offenses, generally carrying penal exposure of more than ten
years, tried by the higher criminal court (the cour d’assises).202 This division of offenses means that many offenses that would constitute lower-level
felonies in the United States, together with misdemeanor offenses, are tried
in the lower tribunal correctionnel, which does not employ juries at all.203
The referral of a case from an investigating magistrate to the cour d’assises
is via a charging document that is valid only if it includes an explanation of
the facts and their legal significance.204
The cour d’assises, unlike the lower tribunal correctionnel, is a mixed
court composed of a presiding judge and two other professional judges205
who hear evidence, deliberate, and vote in conjunction with nine lay jurors,
who must be French citizens, at least twenty-three years old, and literate in
French.206 This arrangement, as intimated above, provides judges with a
splendid confluence: control in the courtroom, influence in the deliberation,
and deflection from ultimate responsibility for the verdict.
200. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As A Guide to American Law Reform: How Do
the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 569 n.132
(1990).
201. WAYNE R. LEFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(a) (6th ed. 2017).
202. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [CPP] art. 181 («Si le juge d’instruction estime que les faits
retenus à la charge des personnes mises en examen constituent une infraction qualifiée crime par la loi, il
ordonne leur mise en accusation devant la cour d’assises.«). Note that referral of the case to the cour
d’assises requires a charging document (“ordonnance”) called the “ordonnance de mise en accusation.”
203. CPP art. 179 («Si le juge estime que les faits constituent un délit, il prononce, par ordonnance, le
renvoi de l’affaire devant le tribunal correctionnel.». For mere contraventions, see art. 178 («Si le juge
estime que les faits constituent une contravention, il prononce, par ordonnance, le renvoi de l’affaire
devant le tribunal de police.»).
204. CPP art. 181 («L’ordonnance de mise en accusation contient, à peine de nullité, l’exposé et la
qualification légale des fait, objet de l’accusation, et précise l’identité de l’accusé.»).
205. The presiding judge and the two assessurs constitute the court “strictly speaking.” CPP art. 243.
206. The court proprement dite (“strictly speaking”) and the jury together comprise the cour
d’assises. CPP art. 240; regarding jurors’ qualifications, see arts. 254–258.
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The written, reviewable verdict in the cour d’assises must address
“each act specified in the reasoning of the charging document” created by
the investigating magistrate below.207 In other words, the trial court must
consider as a distinct question whether each material fact has been proved.
The same provision requires the trial court to consider as distinct questions
each aggravating circumstance and each possible defense or reason for a
lesser degree of culpability.208
One peril of using special findings is that the jurors’ answers to a set of
specific questions about the case may indicate unsound reasoning—in the
view of the public or the legal profession. The French cour d’assises greatly
mitigates this risk by having three professional judges in the deliberation
room.209 Special verdicts rendered by jurors not acting in collaboration with
juridical guidance are more perilous, and such is the practice in Spain.
Unlike France, Spain has evolved over decades into a more accusatorial system, and its juries consist of lay jurors rather than a combination of
lay jurors sitting with professional judges, bringing its practice closer to that
of the United States.210 In an interesting point of connection between civil
law practice and jury trial, the Spanish jury not only answers specific questions, but must also provide a “reasoned verdict” indicating the evidence the
jury found decisive in its decision.211 Some dangers of this system were
illustrated in the 1997 murder trial of Basque separatist Mikel Otegi.212 In
the context of Spanish law, the case was important for a reason that simply
does not translate into a common law system: the Spanish Supreme Court
found that the jury verdict was insufficiently explained.213 Some American
comparatists have suggested that American criminal courts adopt reasoned
verdicts, but not special verdicts in the sense of interrogatories:
Allowing, or requiring, a U.S. jury to issue a written justification for its
verdict in the fashion of Dutch criminal judges or Spanish jurors may raise
fewer constitutional issues about a defendant’s right to a jury trial than
would special verdict forms and interrogatories; the jury would have more
207. CPP art. 349 («Chaque question principale est posée ainsi qu’il suit : «L’accusé est-il coupable
d’avoir commis tel fait ?» Une question est posée sur chaque fait spécifié dans le dispositif de la décision de mise en accusation.»). Here the word dispositif is in danger of being a false cognate with the
English word “disposition,” but refers to the reasoning of the decision of the magistrate below. On the
creation of the ordonnance de mise en accusation by the juge d’instruction, see art. 181.
208. CPP art. 349 («Chaque circonstance aggravante fait l’objet d’une question distincte. Il en est de
même, lorsqu’elle est invoquée, de chaque cause légale d’exemption ou de diminution de la peine.»).
209. CPP art. 240.
210. Michael Csere, Note, Reasoned Criminal Verdicts in the Netherlands and Spain: Implications
for Juries in the United States, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 415, 421 (2013).
211. Id. at 422.
212. THAMAN, supra note 196, at 195–201.
213. Id. at 199 (citing LA LEY (5.12.98), No. 4226, 6, 12–13).
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freedom as it would not be restricted to specific interrogatories as to its
reasoning.214

I agree that this mechanism would be more akin to an open-ended
question rather than the leading questions of interrogatories on a special
verdict form, and in that sense would preserve the jury’s autonomy. That
said, and appreciating the creativity of the idea, I see immediately a possible objection that because the reasoned verdict is an open-ended question to
the jury, it constitutes a greater invasion into the jury’s province, while a
special verdict form limited to questions on the elements and defenses
would merely formalize the questions already required of any jury that returns a general verdict. This article takes the contrary view, proposing consideration of a requirement for interrogatories, but not any rule requiring
panels to explain their decisions beyond answering a question specific to
each element.215
The Otegi crime and trial are intriguing for many reasons–– this discussion will address certain aspects of the verdict form that can be used to
provide a decision tree. Spain’s 1995 law on trial by jury required the presiding judge to “submit to the jury in writing a verdict form” calling for
special findings:
In separate, numbered paragraphs, it shall narrate the acts alleged by the
parties which the jury shall declare to be proved or not, differentiating between those which are contrary to the accused and those which would yield
favorable results. It shall not include in one paragraph acts, some of which
could be susceptible to being proved and others not.216

The Otegi special verdict form thus required a recorded vote to affirm
or deny ninety-eight facts about the shooting and the accused’s mental state,
postulated by both the prosecution and defense. “Principal facts of the prosecution” included:
1. UNFAVORABLE FACT: [The accused, Mikel Otegi] on December 10,
1995, around 10:30 a.m. at the farmhouse Oteizabal, voluntarily and with
intent to kill, shot [police officer Ignacio Mendiluce] with a [12 gauge] shot214. Csere, supra note 210, at 425. See also Alice Curci, Note, Twelve Angrier Men: Enforcing
Verdict Accountability in Criminal Jury Trials, 59 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 217, 219 (2019) (“This Note
argues that justice would be better served if criminal juries were required to return not only a verdict, but
also the underlying rationale.”).
215. Thaman provides the 1988 Spanish Supreme Court decision overturning the Otegi findings on
the basis that “[i]f the court has doubts about the actual occurrence of the acts it should acquit—and this
is obvious—but not erect the expression of this doubt as a basis for acquittal.” THAMAN, supra note
196, at 200. The requirement to justify uncertainty, which may not be uniform among the jurors, seems
to undermine American conceptions of the presumption of innocence (by placing a burden, if not on the
accused, on the juror who is not persuaded by the evidence) and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (as elusive as that standard may be).
216. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal del Jurado § 52(1) (May 22, 1995), as translated in THAMAN, supra
note 196, at 262, excerpted from JULIO MUERZA ESPARAZA, LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL Y OTRAS
NORMAS PROCESALES 209 (10th ed. 2005).
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gun, hitting him in the lower right clavicular region and killing him instantly. Not proved. Majority
2. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi, on the same day and at the same time
and place, and voluntarily, with intent to kill, shot [police officer José González], hitting him in the left scapular region and killing him instantly. Not
proved. Majority
3. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot [police officer Mendiluce] without
there having been any provocation on the part of the latter. Not proved.
Majority
4. [same as “3” in relation to González]
5. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot Mendiluce from a distance of approximately 1.5 meters. Proved. Unanimously
6. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot González from a distance of approximately 2.5 meters. PROVED. UNANIMOUSLY
7. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot Mendiluce in a sudden and unexpected fashion. Not proved. Majority
8. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot Mendiluce before he had a chance
of defending himself. Not proved. Majority
9. UNFAVORABLE FACT: Otegi shot González in the back. Not proved.
Majority

Like an American court-martial panel, the Spanish jury decision could
decide specific questions and the ultimate verdict by a non-unanimous
vote.217
“Facts Which Are Object of the Defense” included:
48. FAVORABLE FACT: At [Otegi’s home] the argument with the Basque
Police officers resumed, Otegi now armed with the loaded shotgun. Proved.
Unanimously
49. FAVORABLE FACT: In the course of the argument, the Basque Police
officer González pointed his weapon at Otegi. Proved. Majority
50. FAVORABLE FACT: In the course of the argument, Otegi felt that the
weapon of the Basque Police officer González was pointed at him. Proved.
Majority
51. FAVORABLE FACT: Then Otegi completely lost control of his actions.
Proved. Majority
52. FAVORABLE FACT: (only if the preceding fact “51” has not been
proved): Then Otegi partially lost control of his actions. (No answer)
217. THAMAN, supra note 196, at 195–96.
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53. UNFAVORABLE FACT: In this situation, Otegi fired the shotgun.
Proved. Unanimously
54. FAVORABLE FACT: Otegi fired two shots without intending to kill.
Proved. Majority
55. FAVORABLE FACT: Otegi fired two shots without consciousness of
killing. Proved. Majority218

Query whether the first question posed to the jurors accorded with the
statute’s instruction not to pose compound questions. Question 1 asked not
only whether Otegi shot police officer Ignacio Mendiluce—a physical act—
but also whether Otegi did so “voluntarily and with intent to kill”—the
mens rea that distinguishes homicide offenses by degree.219 A decision tree
model of special verdict forms could begin with the question of whether the
evidence proved the act of the accused having shot the victim, with subsequent questions asking whether the accused did the act with the intent element defining the homicide offense of that jurisdiction, in descending order.
For example, if the jurors found the accused had shot the victim, the next
questions might sequentially ask if the evidence proved the accused acted
with intent to kill, with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, with reckless
indifference, or with simple negligence. An affirmative vote on any degree
of intent would stop the voting, and a negative vote on all the degrees of
criminal culpability would be a finding that the accused had committed the
physical act, but without any guilty mind. In the Otegi verdict form, Questions 78–91 asked “various favorable and unfavorable facts which could
aggravate or mitigate criminal responsibility,” but these questions were in
addition to compound questions that would seem to have gone to the ultimate question of each charge. In other words, this kind of verdict form
represents a surfeit of questions inviting confusion of the decisive issues.
Also dubious is the value of labeling questions as favorable or unfavorable to the accused. The likely impact of a question on the trial outcome
will often be obvious, but to the extent the import of a question is not
clear—and always in principle—the jurors’ decision should be based on the
law and the evidence rather than a desire to support the prosecution or the
defense.
Note as well that Question 52 (partial loss of “control” by the accused)
was bypassed as mooted by the affirmative answer to Question 51 (com218. Id. at 196–97.
219. In the civil law tradition, this concept of intent is called the moral element; an act is punishable
only if the law proves the legal element (textual proscription), the physical element (the actus reus), and
the moral element (the mens rea). See, e.g., in France, CODE PÉNAL arts. 111-3 («Nul ne peut être puni
pour un crime ou pour un délit dont les éléments ne sont pas définis par la loi, ou pour une contravention
dont les éléments ne sont pas définis par le règlement.») and 121-3 («Il n’y a point de crime ou de délit
sans intention de le commettre.»).
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plete loss of “control” by the accused). The vote on Question 51 having
been by a majority, a unanimous vote on Question 53 then found that “[i]n
this situation, Otegi fired the shotgun.” This result implies that even the
jurors who did not vote on Question 51 for a finding that Otegi had lost his
ability to act willfully nevertheless accepted the premise of Question 53 as
having been established by the earlier majority vote. Logically, a juror who
did not accept the premise of Question 53 should have felt entitled to vote
no on the question.
C. Hypothetical Special Verdict Panel Questions
Having examined jury questions in a number of forms and fora, this
article will now consider how courts-martial could use jury questions to
obtain special verdicts, using examples from commonly-tried offenses. The
UCMJ defines several sexual offenses against adult victims, including rape,
sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, and abusive sexual contact.220
These offenses distinguish offenses of bodily penetration (without regard to
gender) from offenses of external contact, and distinguish the degree of
actual or constructive force used to commit the offense.221 The offense of
sexual assault can be charged using alternate theories of criminal liability,
such as placing someone in fear to gain acquiescence to a sexual act or
committing a sexual act upon someone incapable of consenting due to impairment.222
Military panels are instructed that the elements of the offense of “sexual assault when the victim is incapable of consenting” are as follows:
(1) That (state the time and place alleged), the accused committed (a) sexual
act(s) upon (state the name of the alleged victim) by (state the alleged sexual
act);
(2) That the accused did so when (state the name of the alleged victim) was
incapable of consenting to the sexual act(s) due to (impairment by a drug,
intoxicant, or other similar substance) (a mental disease or defect, or physical disability); and
(3) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known (state the name
of the alleged victim) was incapable of consenting to the sexual act(s) due to
(impairment by drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance) (a mental disease or defect, or physical disability).223

The parentheses indicate places where the military judge tailors the
instructions for each case based on the charging instrument, which in mili220.
221.
222.
223.

10 U.S.C. § 920 (2021).
Id.
10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(1)(A), (b)(3)(A).
BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at 1377.
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tary practice is called simply the “charge sheet.”224 In these cases, and similarly in the other varieties of sexual assault, the existing jury instruction
format suggests the form of the questions panel members might be asked if
they were to record a vote on each element.
The questions in a hypothetical case under this provision might be:
(1) Did Adam Accusatus, at or near Fort Hood, Texas, on or about 20 February 2022, commit a sexual act upon Valerie Victima by penetrating her
vulva with his penis?
[If three quarters voted yes, proceed to question 2.]
(2) Did Adam Accusatus do so when Valerie Victima was incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to impairment by alcohol?
[If three quarters voted yes, proceed to question 3.]
(3) Did Adam Accusatus know, or should he have known that Valerie Victima was incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to impairment by
alcohol?

In this example, the decision tree includes simply sequential questions.
The procedure becomes more complex—more akin to tax preparation perhaps—when there are lesser included offenses raised by the evidence. The
Military Judges’ Benchbook currently provides that lesser included offenses
will be explained in descending order, and distinguished from the greater
offense:
The offense charged,__________, and the lesser included offense of
__________ differ (in that the offense charged requires as (an) element(s)
that you be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (state the element(s)
applicable only to the greater offense), whereas the lesser offense of
__________ does not include such (an) element(s).
(When an LIO involves lesser specific intent)
However, the lesser offense of __________ does require that you be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s act(s) (was) (were) done
(recklessly) (negligently) (with the specific intent to __________).
(When attempt is an LIO)
However, the lesser offense of attempted _________ does require that you
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s act(s) (was) (were)
done with the specific intent to commit the offense of __________, that the
act(s) amounted to more than mere preparation and that the act(s) apparently
tended to bring about the commission of the offense of __________.225

If the verdict form were transformed into a decision tree of questions,
the distinction between the offenses could be integrated into the question
series. The distinction between larceny and wrongful appropriation, familiar
224. Department of Defense Form 458 (May 2000). For an example, see the redacted charge sheet
for Chelsea Manning, then known as Bradley Manning, at https://perma.cc/U6FD-3CJQ.
225. BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at 65.
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to any American lawyer, provides a ready example.226 The following questions attempt to account for the distinction between larceny and wrongful
appropriation, and also the military statute’s increased potential sentence
for property worth more than $500:
(1) Did Adam Accusatus, at or near Fort Hood, Texas, on or about 20 February 2022, wrongfully take certain property, that is, an Apple MacBook
Pro, from the possession of Valerie Victima?
[If three quarters voted yes, continue to question 2.]
(2) Did the property belong to Valerie Victima?
[If three quarters voted yes, continue to question 3.]
(3) Was the property of a value of $950?
[If three quarters voted yes, continue to question 5;
if not, go to question 4.]
(4) Was the property of some lesser value, but more than $500?
[If three quarters voted yes, continue to question 6;
if not, go to question 5.]
(5) Was the property of some value, but less than $500?
[If three quarters voted yes, continue to question 6.]
(6) Was the taking by Adam Accusatus with the intent permanently to deprive Valerie Victima of the use and benefit of the property or permanently
to appropriate the property to Adam Accusatus’s own use or the use of
someone other than Valerie Victima?
[If three quarters voted yes, the voting has concluded;
if not, go to question 7.]
(7) Was the taking by Adam Accusatus with the intent temporarily to deprive Valerie Victima of the use and benefit of the property or temporarily
to appropriate the property to Adam Accusatus’s own use or the use of
someone other than Valerie Victima?227

These questions, in conjunction with the necessary definitions, would
distinguish between the two offenses, and implicitly include a determination that there was a wrongful intent at least to commit the lesser offense.
They also would determine whether the amount of the taking was more than
$500, or at least the taking of an article “of some value,” as required to
constitute either of the two offenses.
One question—in the realm of policy—is whether an anonymous
three-quarters vote of the members on each element really equates to a
three-quarters vote of guilty, since the majority on each element might not
226. For the military offense, which has certain peculiarities, see 10 U.S.C. § 921.
227. Questions 1–6 are derived from BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at 660, and Questions 1–5 and 7
are derived from BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at 672.
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overlap. Consider an example of larceny, simplified slightly by focusing on
only the elements of ownership and value, given eight jurors A through H.
On the element of ownership of the property, jurors A, B, C, D, E, and F
vote yes, and jurors G and H vote no. On the element of the property having
some value, jurors A and B vote no, while jurors C, D, E, F, G, and H vote
yes. In an anonymous vote, it would be established only that the required
three quarters of the members voted that the element had been proved, and
it would not be disclosed that only jurors C, D, E, and F voted for guilt on
both elements. Arguably, this would not be acceptable as a “general verdict,” because it would not mean that three-quarters voted for guilt on every
element.
If it must be confirmed that the necessary majority voted for guilt on
each element, while preserving anonymity, the jurors could be provided
with numbered voting tickets, so that the panel member charged with tallying the vote (in military practice, the junior member)228 could use a provided worksheet—separate from the questions and instructions—to record
each vote, with a column for each member and a row for each question.
Admittedly, this would require more complicated instructions about
whether a certain vote eliminated the need for further voting. A properly
recorded vote, however, would allow the worksheet to be reviewed by the
trial judge and the parties to assure a three-quarters vote of the same members.
If court-martial panels were allowed or required to use special findings, an appropriate level of articulation might be to ask a single question
for each element of an offense or affirmative defense, or a single question
for each material fact in an element that contains more than one material
fact. This would reduce the likelihood of confusion or inconsistent findings,
which has happened in European systems with extensive jury questionnaires, and also constitutes a greater invasion into the deliberation of the
panel. Also, questions tracking closely with the elements could aid panel
members in adhering to their oath to decide the case based on the law and
evidence, without eliminating their authority to decide the case as conscience dictates. While some American commentators have suggested borrowing the civil law practice of requiring a reasoned verdict, that would
constitute a greater intrusion into the province of the trier of fact and would
be an innovation inconsistent with American legal culture even in the context of the court-martial panel.

228. BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, at 69–72.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article asked the reader to consider the origins and powers of the
peer jury, and how those origins and powers created a domain into which
judges cannot intrude. These are the substantive reasons the jury in a criminal case cannot be required to return a special verdict. Next the article described the origins and powers of the court-martial panel and posited that
the arguments against special verdicts by juries cannot be transferred to the
court-martial panel, which is not simply a jury by another name. Whether
the use of special verdicts would more often favor the prosecution or the
defense I cannot say, but it might “nudge” panel members to a more particularized examination of the elements of each offense, which would contribute to consistency and uniformity in verdicts.
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